A Risky Business: Moving New Zealand Towards a Managed-Care Health System by Howell, Bronwyn
2002 saw perhaps the most fundamental change to New Zealand’s primary
healthcare system in the last seventy years: the New Zealand Primary
Healthcare Strategy (NZPHCS). With this strategy, New Zealand moved 
to a system where the insurance role is vested in some 80 predominantly
provider-owned PHOs – and where variation in patient demand within 
PHOs is managed by individual GPs who have become ‘de facto’ insurers.
Four years on from this historic change, Bronwyn Howell analyses 
some of the key issues that will determine the success of the new strategy. 
In this monograph, she describes the complex interaction between 
healthcare markets and insurance that lies at the heart of the new arrangements. 
At issue is how the NZPHCS will manage the trade-off between patient costs
and choice of provider, the power of providers to set fees, the interaction
between ownership of PHOs and governance arrangements, and equity issues. 
One of the key risks identified in Bronwyn's analysis is that the current
‘interim’ arrangements will become entrenched, requiring further legislative
change to bring about the NZPHCS’s vision of integrated care.
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In 2002, New Zealand’s primary healthcare markets
– defined as those community-based healthcare
services where individuals make their first point of
contact with a health provider when seeking
treatment for an illness or injury – were
fundamentally changed. 
As part of a strategy intended to reduce health
disparities between individuals and to improve
health outcomes, the historic fee-for-service ‘Section
88’ government subsidies provided to reduce some1
individuals’  costs of accessing general practitioner
(GP) services were replaced by universal
government-funded capitation payments. These
capitation payments varied with the individual’s age,
ethnicity, gender, health state, and the population-
based characteristics of the individual’s chosen co-
ordinating entity; and they were paid to newly
formed service coordinating entities known as
Primary Health Organisations (PHOs). The PHOs
were charged with registering the individuals for
whom they would receive capitation funds, and with
entering into contracts with service providers (such
as GPs, nurses, health workers, dieticians, and
educators) to provide agreed primary healthcare
services, as required, to the registered individuals.2
In addition, the government signalled its
intention to substantially increase the quantity of
taxpayer funds applied to primary healthcare, with
the objective of substantially reducing the share of
private expenditure in the sector. At between 60%
and 70% of sector spending, private expenditure in
New Zealand was substantially higher than in
comparable countries such as the United Kingdom
and Australia. $1.7 billion was committed over 6
years to implement the strategy, with the additional
spending representing a 43% increase in
government spending on primary healthcare in the
first three years alone.3
The concept: 
a population-based approach
The strategy – the New Zealand Primary Healthcare
Strategy (NZPHCS) – was heralded as a new
approach to primary healthcare in New Zealand. It
provided resources, contractual obligations and
incentives for PHOs to provide integrated packages
of care for individuals across provider types and
across time. Capitation-based funding would
provide financial incentives; geographically-based
PHOs, formed within each of the 21 regional District
Health Board (DHB) boundaries, would negotiate
and administer the contracts. Regional specificity
offered some assurance that the contracts entered
into by the PHOs would be sensitive to the different
needs and preferences of individual communities.
Relationships between PHOs and their registered
individuals would also ensure that consistent
information on each individual was maintained, 
so that all individuals could receive continuous 
and integrated care irrespective of the identities 
of the providers delivering the various services 
(see Figure 1). 
Capitation-based funding was chosen because
the historic fee-for-service ‘Section 88’ payments
were deemed to create cost-related barriers to
accessing primary healthcare, especially for low-
income and chronically ill individuals4 – even though
higher subsidies were paid for low-income or high-
use individuals,5 and for high-priority populations
such as children under 6 years of age.6 The payment
method was also thought to encourage a culture
wherein primary healthcare was perceived as an
intervention when illness occurred, rather than as a
pivotal tool in encouraging preventive care and
promoting wellness. 
The change in payment incentives was seen as
an important factor for reducing the incidence and
impact of chronic illnesses such as diabetes and
asthma, which were contributing disproportionately
to observed health-outcome disparities between
ethnic groups.7 By being paid a fixed per-registrant
fee, PHOs would face financial incentives to
prioritise preventive and educational activities for all
registered individuals. Devoting resources solely to
treating only that subset of individuals who had
actually fallen ill and sought treatment would cease,
and long-term costs would reduce.8
Under ‘Section 88’, payments had been
restricted to care provided by GPs, and patients
were deterred from accessing other care providers
(such as nurse practitioners, educators, physiother-
apists, and alternative therapists). As these other
services were not subsidised, they were available
only to higher-income individuals. Furthermore,
some of their benefits (such as education) accrued
as a public good rather than a private one, so their
provision was not explicitly remunerated.
Consequently, fewer of the non-GP services were
provided, even though their benefits were positive
and would have been more efficacious than the
subsidised GP services that were sought in their
absence. By allowing PHOs the discretion to enter
into contracts for a wide variety of service types, and
to purchase ‘public goods’ on behalf of a constituent
population, it was anticipated that the existing model
of care would be replaced by a more broad-based
model in which the PHO would integrate multi-
provider care packages to ensure customised but
1 Eligibility was determined by age, family
income, and health state.
2 Minister of Health. 2001. The Primary
Healthcare Strategy (available online at
www.moh.govt.nz; search under
document name).
3 Martin Hefford, Peter Crampton and Jon
Foley. 2005. ‘Reducing disparities
through primary care reform: the New
Zealand experiment’ Health Policy 72
pp9-23; and Consumers’ Institute. 2005.
Healthy Fees. 3 May (available online at
www.consumer.org nz; search under ‘GP
fees’).
4 National Health Committee. 2000.
Improving Health for New Zealanders by
Investing in Primary Care (available
online at www.nhc.govt.nz/publications/
improvinghealth.htm).
5 ‘Low income’ was identified by an
individual’s Community Service Card
(CSC); eligibility for a CSC was
determined by income. ‘High use’ was
identified by a High Use Health Card
(HUHC); eligibility for a HUHC was
determined by the number of GP visits
(12 or more) in one year. 
6 Kate Scott, John C Marwick and Peter R
Crampton. 2003. ‘Utilisation of general
practitioner services in New Zealand and
its relationship with income, ethnicity and
government subsidy’ Health Services
Management Research 16(1) pp45-55.
7 Minister of Health. 2000. The Future
Shape of Primary Healthcare: A
Discussion Document. (available online
at www.moh.govt.nz; search under
document name).
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Capitation
payments are not
‘subsidies’ for
‘visits’. Capitation
payments are
made to a PHO
on the basis of
how many
individuals it has
on its books,
irrespective of
the number of
visits.
coordinated primary healthcare service delivery
focused on individual and community needs.9
PHOs were pivotal to the implementation of the
NZPHCS. They were required to be nonprofit
entities ‘to guard against public funds being diverted
from health gain and health services to shareholder
dividends’,10 and to be able to demonstrate that all
contracted service providers and their constituent
communities were represented in their decision-
making. PHOs were also required to be transparent
and accountable to the public about their use of
public funds and the quality and effectiveness of the
services they provided.11
Nonetheless, PHOs had complete freedom to
enter into contracts of any form with providers of any
professional discipline or any organisational or
ownership form (including for-profit providers) in
order to deliver on their NZPHCS obligations, which
would be specified in contracts between the PHO
and its respective DHB. Placing contractual co-
ordination at the PHO level and having service-
provider involvement in PHO governance was
intended to facilitate the replacement of ‘old isolated
ways of working’ with ‘new collaborative models’.12
The requirement for nonprofit structure and
provider representation in decision-making was
modelled on the structure and representation of a
small group of community-oriented primary
healthcare providers that had emerged over the
1990s. These providers, typically based around
union healthcare centres and groups delivering care
to specific geographic and ethnic communities, had
been quite successful in increasing primary
healthcare access amongst those groups with poorer
health outcomes.13
In practice: some statistics
Since their introduction in July 2002, 81 PHOs have
been formed.14 These PHOs receive capitation
payments on behalf of 95% of New Zealand’s
population, and range in size from 3,200 to 333,000
registrants. 
The key distinction between PHOs lies in the
nature of their registered population base, which
determines the capitation income received. PHOs
with more than 50% of their registered capitation
base exhibiting ‘at risk’ population-based character-
istics15 – known as Access PHOs – receive higher
capitation subsidies for their entire registered
population (including those not exhibiting the ‘at
risk’ characteristics). The remainder – known as
Interim PHOs – receive lower capitation payments
for their entire registered population (including
those who do exhibit the ‘at risk’ characteristics).
However, the Interim PHOs receive higher capitation
subsidies for their low-income CSC-holding
registrants than they do for their non-CSC-holding
registrants. A separate management fee, which
varies with the number of registrants in the PHO, is
paid to cover the administrative costs of the system.
There is also a separately paid capitated fee for
developing new initiatives that will increase access to
services – this fee varies according to population-
based characteristics in the PHO. 
When announcing the NZPHCS, the Minister
expressed the intention of gradually increasing
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8 Peter Crampton, Frances Sutton and Jon
Foley. 2003. ‘Capitation funding of primary
care services: principles and prospects’
Journal of the New Zealand Medical
Association 115(1155) p43 (available
online at www.nzma.org.nz/journal/115-
1155/43/).
9 Gregor Coster and Barry Gribben. 1999.
Primary Care Models for Delivering
Population-Based Health Outcomes.
Discussion paper for the National Health
Committee. August (available online at
www.nhc.govt.nz/publications/phc/
phcmodels.html).
10 Minister of Health. 2001. op. cit. p14. 
11 Ibid. p5. 
12 Ibid. p18. 
13 Laurence Malcolm, Lyn Wright and Pauline
Barnett. 1999. The Development of
Primary Care Organisations in New
Zealand. A review undertaken for The
Treasury and the Ministry of Health.
Wellington. 
14 (www.moh.govt.nz/moh.nsf/wpg_index/
-Primary+Health+Care+Established+
PHOs+by+DHB)
15 ‘At risk’ characteristics are: Maori or Pacific
Island ethnicity; or living in an area
assessed as decile 9 or 10 in the New
Zealand Deprivation Index.
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Figure 1. NZPHCS primary healthcare arrangements
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Capitation payments (per registered person per year)1
Payment Type: GMS/Nurse2 Payment Type: Services to Improve Access3
Interim PHO4 Access PHO5 All
HUHC6 HUHC Maori/Pacific Non Maori/Pacific
Age Gender CSC7 w’out with w’out with NZDI 1-48 NZDI 58 NZDI 1-48 NZDI 58
00-04 F with $308.12 $471.96 $315.73 $471.96 $63.15 $126.29 $0.00 $63.15 
w’out $308.12 $471.96 
M with $327.88 $471.96 $332.42 $471.96 $66.48 $132.97 $0.00 $66.48 
w’out $327.88 $471.96 
05-14 F with $79.33 $302.61 $99.94 $302.61 $19.99 $39.98 $0.00 $19.99 
w’out $79.33 $302.61 
M with $75.18 $302.61 $93.54 $302.61 $18.71 $37.42 $0.00 $18.71 
w’out $75.18 $302.61 
15-24 F with $78.90 $291.50 $92.22 $291.50 $18.44 $36.89 $0.00 $18.44 
w’out $36.09 $291.50 
M with $42.38 $291.50 $50.75 $291.50 $10.15 $20.30 $0.00 $10.15 
w’out $20.79 $291.50 
25-44 F with $72.61 $291.50 $81.04 $291.50 $16.21 $32.41 $0.00 $16.21 
w’out $7.32 $291.50 
M with $43.16 $291.50 $52.38 $291.50 $10.48 $20.95 $0.00 $10.48 
w’out $5.91 $291.50 
45-64 F with $88.74 $319.27 $110.99 $319.27 $22.20 $44.40 $0.00 $22.20 
w’out $12.22 $319.27 
M with $67.96 $319.27 $82.90 $319.27 $16.58 $33.16 $0.00 $16.58 
w’out $9.57 $319.27 
65+ F with $191.27 $342.40 $191.27 $342.40 $38.25 $76.51 $0.00 $38.25 
w’out $191.27 $342.40 
M with $164.95 $342.40 $164.95 $342.40 $32.99 $65.98 $0.00 $32.99 
w’out $164.95 $342.40 
Capitation payments
1 The figures in the Table exclude per-capita management
fees, which are paid irrespective of Access or Interim status
and are based upon PHO size. These per-capita manage-
ment fees are:
• for PHOs with fewer than 75,000 registered individuals:
$9.61 per registered individual up to 20,000; and $4.67
per registered individual thereafter
• for PHOs with more than 75,000 registered individuals:
$6.41 per registered individual for the first 20,000;
$5.83 per registered individual for the next 20,001 to
75,000; and $5.25 per registered individual thereafter.
Payment type
2 GMS/Nurse: payment for services to be provided by GP or
practice nurse. This is nominally based upon a notional
consultation ‘subsidy’ of $36.40 for children under 6 and
$26 for all other population groups eligible for low- or
reduced-cost access – thereby presuming on average
13 fully subsidised visits for a HUHC young child and 8.5 fully
subsidised visits for other children; and 6.3 partially subsidised
visits per annum for a 65+ man and 7.4 partially subsidised
visits for a 65+ woman (or 3.3 and 3.8 fully subsidised visits for
the 65+ man and 65+ woman, assuming a $50 cost per visit). 
3 Services to Improve Access; payment to develop access
initiatives for high-needs populations (paid in addition to
GMS/Nurse capitation payment).
PHO type
4 Interim PHOs: less than 50% of their registered population
have Maori or Pacific Island ethnicity or are living in areas
determined to be in NZDI deciles 9 or 10.
5 Access PHOs: more than 50% of their registered population
have Maori or Pacific Island ethnicity or are living in areas
determined to be in NZDI deciles 9 or 10.
Individual characteristics
6 HUHC: High User Health Card – identifies an individual
making 12 or more GP visits a year.
7 CSC: Community Services Card – identifies low-income or
beneficiary status of individual (relevant only to Interim
PHOs).
NZDI (New Zealand Deprivation Index classifications)
8 1–4 represents deciles 1-8; 5 represents deciles 9-10.
Source: Ministry of Health. 
Table 1. PHO types and annual capitation payments 2004/05 
Interim PHO capitation payments as budgets
allowed (using age as a distinguishing factor, and
increasing payments first to the highest-using
groups) in order to gradually eliminate any individual
distinguishing characteristics based upon income.
The intention was that the population-based charac-
teristics of a PHO’s registered patient base would
become the sole determinants of allocating primary
healthcare funding. Following strenuous
submissions by the Independent Practitioners
Association Council (IPAC) in 2002,16 the original
population-based funding formulae were
augmented to include additional payments for
individuals with chronically poor health states (as
indicated by having a HUHC). This amendment
recognised the demands on available funding that
were created by individuals because of their actual
health state and that were unrelated to the presence
or absence of ‘at risk’ population-based character-
istics. As a further response, a new population-based
funding package (CarePlus) was implemented in July
2004, with the intention that it would eventually
replace individual characteristics such as the HUHC
as a determinant of PHO funding.17 The full range of
subsidies for the 2004/05 financial year (July-June) is
given in Table 1. 
16 Independent Practitioners Association
Council of New Zealand. 2002. Options
for Introducing New Primary Healthcare
Funding (available online at
www.nzdoctor.co.nz/IPAC%20funding%2
0report.PDF).
17 (www.moh.govt.nz/moh.nsf/wpg_Index/
Publications-Care+Plus:+an+Overview)
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In essence, the NZPHCS introduced a ‘managed
care’ primary healthcare model to New Zealand.
Managed healthcare models balance the costs of
and demands for primary healthcare by applying a
defined budget (set by capitation) to meet the health
needs of a defined population. They utilise a
combination of fiscal and practice-based strategies
to meet their objectives. Fiscal strategies (including
capitation payment of service providers, price-and-
volume contracts, preferred-provider networks, and
utilisation review) constrain the higher costs that
typically attend fee-for-service subsidised systems
by making service providers bear some of the
financial risks that their decision-making invokes.18
Practice-based strategies seek to ‘reduce variability
in medical care by identifying “best practices” and
promoting adherence to guideline-based decision-
making. This includes evaluating the appropri-
ateness of services rendered and the level of care
necessary to provide the services.’19
Borrowing from both the United
States and the United Kingdom
Managed care has become popular in the United
States as a means of arresting very strong growth in
healthcare spending driven by the historic fee-for-
service insurance funding,20 and in the United
Kingdom as a means of making health services more
responsive to local needs and priorities.21 In the
United States, managed care has competed with
traditional indemnity-based insurance models and
initially it proved very popular, especially in western
and mid-western states. But its market share relative
to other models is reducing from early highs, with
approximately 25% of United States citizens enrolled
in such schemes in 2003.22 In the United Kingdom,
the NHS23 Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) provide all
state-funded primary healthcare and are funded
predominantly by capitation payments for defined
populations.
The United States managed-care experience
suggests that significant changes in practitioner
behaviour have been achieved using very low-
powered fiscal incentives.24 Furthermore, significant
changes have occurred in the organisation of the
primary healthcare workforce, with formerly
independent providers allying to form ‘preferred
provider networks’ and even merging into large
corporate firms, in order to more efficiently manage
the significant financial risks associated with
capitation payment25 and to reduce the transaction
costs of negotiating contracts with the managed-
care entities.26 The Healthcare Financing
Administration considers capitated primary
healthcare physician groups to be at substantial
financial risk if they have fewer than 25,000
registered patients. 
Contractual alliances between managed-care
entities and providers in the United States have also
led to the formation of large and vertically integrated
chains, in which exclusive contracts bind providers
to providing services to the clients of a single care
manager. Competition for customers now occurs on
the basis of the bundle of management and care-
delivery services offered. From a customer
perspective, the most noticeable change has been
the restriction of practitioner choice, as patients
must now select providers from those with whom
the managed-care entity has an exclusive provision
contract.27
Restriction in provider choice is traded off
against the substantial reduction in premiums paid
(the reduction being made possible by the
providers’ fiscal incentives to reduce service-
delivery costs). But many individuals see only the
reduction in choice, as employers typically select the
scheme and pay the premiums on the individuals’
behalf. This has led to a noticeable reduction in the
level of trust between patients and service
providers: there is a growing perception that
contracted providers are acting principally as agents
of the managed-care entity, in conflict with their
traditional role as dedicated (and exclusive) agents
of the patient.28 Some analysts have attributed lack of
patient choice of service provider as a principal
reason for managed care’s declining popularity.29
The United Kingdom’s experience with
managed care also suggests that patient choice of
practitioner and service type matters.30 However,
direct comparisons between the United States,
United Kingdom and New Zealand experiences are
difficult to draw because of the different services
provided and the different payment mechanisms
employed. In the United Kingdom, patients make no
out-of-pocket payments for NHS-funded services –
unlike New Zealand where, even with NZPHCS
increases in government expenditure, out-of-pocket
expenses in primary care still amount to around 60%
of sector spending, and have not reduced as fast as
was expected when the strategy was put in place.31
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18 David Dranove and Mark Satterthwaite.
2000. ‘The Industrial Organisation of
Healthcare Markets’ Chapter 20 in A
Culyer and  J Newhouse (eds) Handbook
of Health Economics. Elsevier.
Amsterdam. 
19 Patrick Asubonteng Rivers and Kai-Li Tsai.
2003. ‘Managing costs and managing
care’ International Journal of Healthcare
Quality Assurance 14(6/7) pp302-307. 
20 James C Robinson. 2004a. ‘Reinvention
of health insurance in the consumer era’
Journal of the American Medical
Association 291(15) pp1880-1886.
21 Justin Keen, Donald Light and Nicholas
Mays. 2001. Public-Private Relations in
Healthcare. King’s Fund. London.
22 Elizabeth Simpkin and Karen Janousek.
2003. ‘Why are we without risk? The
physician organization at the crossroads’
Journal of Healthcare Finance 29(3) pp1-
10.
23 National Health Service.
24 Ching-To Albert Ma and Thomas G
McGuire. 2002. ‘Network incentives in
managed healthcare’ Journal of
Economics and Management Strategy
11(1) pp1-35. 
25 Gerard F Anderson and Wendy E Weller.
1999. ‘Methods of reducing the financial
risk of physicians under capitation’
Archives of Family Medicine 8(2) pp149-
155.
26 James C Robinson. 2004b. ‘The limits of
prepaid group practice’ Chapter 10 in AC
Enthoven and LA Tollen Towards a 21st
Century Health System: the
Contributions and Promise of Prepaid
Group Practice. Jossey Bass. San
Francisco.
27 Robinson. 2004a. op. cit.
28 Anne Pereira and Steven Pearson. 2001.
‘Patient attitudes toward physician
financial incentives’ Archives of Internal
Medicine 161(10) pp1313-1317. 
29 Audley Kao, Diane C Green, Alan M
Zaslavsky, Jeffrey P Koplan, and Paul D
Cleary. 1998. ‘The relationship between
method of physician payment and patient
trust’ Journal of the American Medical
Association 290(19) pp1708-14. 
30 Christopher Ham. 2004. Reforming the
NHS. Presentation to the New Zealand
Health Economists Meeting, Wellington.
3 November. 
31 Minister of Health. 2004. Cabinet Paper
2004: Primary Healthcare Strategy –
Achieving Low Cost Access
(available online at
www.moh.govt.nz/moh.nsf/wpg_index/
-Primary+Health+Care+Publications).
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The United States funding arrangement, where
employers pay premium subsidies to managed-care
entities and patients may pay a part-payment when
treatment is sought, bears more similarity to the New
Zealand PHOs’ government subsidies and patient
co-payments. 
However, unlike the United States, where
patient payments are typically determined by the
insurer or managed-care entity, New Zealand has its
payment terms set by the service providers.
Furthermore, unlike both the United Kingdom and
the United States, New Zealand patients are not
overtly restricted in their choice of practitioner (even
though they are required to nominate a preferred
provider). Indeed, the strategy explicitly reinforces
freedom of patient choice.32 The NZPHCS allows
patients to seek care from any practitioner
irrespective of PHO registration, invoking a
‘clawback’ adjustment to capitation payments
reflecting the differences between capitation
allocation and point-of-service delivery. 
The most significant similarity between the
United Kingdom and the New Zealand managed-
care models lies in the ownership and governance
structures. Both New Zealand’s PHOs and the
United Kingdom’s PCTs are required to be nonprofit
entities and to have both community and provider
representation in their decision-making. Whilst
investigation into the efficacy of the United Kingdom
governance structures is still in its preliminary stages,
early evidence points to substantial governance
costs (arising from the lack of governance
experience amongst the community appointees) and
to communication difficulties between the predomi-
nantly male provider representatives and the
predominantly female community representatives
(arising from their very disparate backgrounds,
interests and motivations for involvement). These
factors have led to considerable tensions between
the two groups – and these tensions have hampered
the ability of the PCT boards to make timely strategic
decisions.33
Governance issues have not presented
significant problems in the United States, because of
the clear commercial separation of care-
management activities and service-delivery activities
that arises from the explicit commercial separation of
the managed-care entity (which is an insurance
entity with different ownership and commercial
activities from those of the service providers). Such
distinctions are less clear in the New Zealand and
United Kingdom, where government is the implicit
insurer and various aspects of the insurer role have
been separately delegated via legislative and
contractual arrangements. Moreover, in the publicly
funded New Zealand and United Kingdom systems,
government involvement as subsidiser, regulator,
policymaker, and legislator has meant that the
relationships between PHOs/PCTs, registered
individuals and the government may carry many
additional dimensions over and above the
commercial imperatives of insurance, care-
management and care-delivery provision. For
example, the political expectation that New Zealand
practitioners will charge different co-payments for
patients in different government-determined
payment categories creates a mechanism for socially
motivated wealth-transfer, in addition to the wealth-
transfers already being effected by the tax system.34
The best of both systems?
Whilst the New Zealand implementation has been
lauded as embodying the ‘best’ of both systems,35
the real test will come in how it addresses the worst
elements that have emerged from each system –
principally the trade-off between patient costs and
provider choice, and the costs and implications
arising from sector ownership, governance and
organisation of interaction.  
The US managed-
care entity is
clearly an insurer.
Its ownership and
commercial 
activities are
explicitly separated
from those of the
service provider.
32 Minister of Health. 2001. (See footnote 2). 
33 J Smith and N Goodwin. 2002.
Developing effective commissioning by
primary care trusts: lessons from the
research evidence. Discussion paper
DP38. Health Services Management
Centre, University of Birmingham. 
34 Bronwyn Howell. 2005. Restructuring
Primary Healthcare Markets in New
Zealand: Financial Risk, Competition,
Innovation and Governance Implications.
Institute for the Study of Competition and
Regulation. Wellington (available online
at www.iscr.org.nz/documents/
primaryhealthcaremarkets.pdf).
35 Martin Hefford, Peter Crampton and Jon
Foley. 2005 (see footnote 3). 
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Healthcare markets differ from markets for many
other products and services because the product
‘healthcare’ has some different economic character-
istics. These characteristics, originally articulated by
Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow in his landmark 1963
paper on the economics of healthcare,36 have
resulted in a number of features that distinguish
healthcare markets from those for other products –
namely the intertwining of healthcare and insurance
markets, and significant information asymmetries
between patients and providers. 
Insurance: a matter of trade-offs
Arrow demonstrates that insurance (risk
management) reduces the uncertainty (demand
uncertainty) that individuals face about being able to
afford healthcare if and when they fall ill. All
individuals seeking insurance cover pay a regular
premium into an insurance fund, and the fund pays a
treatment subsidy in respect of those individuals
who fall ill and therefore need healthcare. The
principal task of the insurance fund manager is to
‘balance’ the premium income with benefit
payments. This involves trading off the interests of
two groups of individuals: Group A (all insured
individuals), who prefer to pay low premiums for the
assurance that they can access an acceptable level of
treatment if and when they fall ill; and Group B
(those insured individuals who have fallen ill), who
prefer that the insurance fund pays as much as
possible of the costs of the best available treatments.
Insurance is thus the ‘upstream’ component of a
two-part health system; the ‘downstream’
component is the provision of healthcare to Group B
individuals (albeit subsidised by the provision of
insurance benefits). These relationships are
illustrated in Figure 2.
In an ‘ideal’ insurance fund, the insurer will use
population-based information to determine the likely
costs of Group B’s illnesses, and will apportion these
costs across all of Group A by setting the premium
charge. The apportionment may be equal
(community rating), or based on measures of the
projected likelihood of a given individual falling ill
and causing costs (individual-risk rating), or a
combination of the two. 
In respect of actual payment of treatment
benefits, it does not matter to the insurer which
Group A individuals actually fall ill and become
Group B individuals – what matters is the ability to
predict total costs as accurately as possible in order
to ensure sufficient funds are available to pay for the
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Healthcare-provision marketOff market
Sponsor
(eg government)
Premium 
subsidy
Insurance 
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Provider contract
Health-insurance/risk-management market
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treatment subsidy
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necessary treatments. In principle, the more
individuals in the scheme, the more accurate will be
the use of population-based projections to assess
likely costs, as the variations between historic
averages and actual costs will on average be smaller.
Consequently, the costs of ‘balancing the books’ by
borrowing to cover deficits (that is, the cost of risk
management) will be less when the number of
Group A individuals is larger. 
But the identity of Group B individuals, the
likelihood of specific Group A individuals becoming
Group B individuals in the future, and the specific
illnesses they will likely develop all matter crucially
when the trade-offs between the two groups are
undertaken. These trade-offs involve setting
premium charges, determining the size of benefits
paid, and identifying the individuals, treatment types
and illnesses for which benefits will be paid (that is,
rationing benefits amongst specific individuals,
illnesses, or care provided by specific provider-
types). The insurance function therefore determines
‘equity’ between specific individuals in both the
allocation of benefits and the allocation of cost
burden. For example, does the insurer allocate
benefits so that all equally ill individuals receive the
same benefits, irrespective of the premiums paid?
And how does the insurer determine the proportion
of the premium payment that is community-rated
(favouring treating all individuals ex ante as equal,
irrespective of the individual’s assessed health state)
and the proportion that is risk-rated (based upon
projected individual differences in future cost-
causing behaviour)? 
The ‘balancing’ role of the insurer is further
complicated in many instances by the presence of
premium subsidies paid by a ‘sponsor’ (such as the
government or an employer). The premium subsidy
is distinct from the treatment subsidy, as the former
is paid for Group A individuals and the latter for
Group B individuals (see Figure 2). Where
transactions occur outside of the insurance
arrangements (for example, where a Group A
individual pays taxes to the government in order to
fund premium subsidies), the ‘balancing’ of interests
must also take these interactions into consideration.
The insurance fund may be a stand-alone
organisation (either private or government-owned)
that charges premiums to all individuals and pays
benefits to ill individuals or their care providers. Or it
may be a vertically integrated government entity that
derives income from taxation and either pays
benefits or provides care directly (via government-
owned healthcare facilities). In both cases, the
fundamental insurance role is unchanged – but in
the latter case the relationships are implicit, as the
government entity pays both the premium subsidies
and the treatment subsidies as internal transactions.
In all cases, the insurance ‘balancing’ will determine
both the efficiency and the equity outcomes of the
system. 
Some consequences 
of health insurance
The presence of subsidised health insurance
increases individuals’ access to and utilisation of
healthcare (compared with a self-insurance system,
where neither insurance nor other subsidies are
present). However, the presence of insurance
creates additional problems that must be addressed
by the ‘balancing contracts’ that the insurer
manages. 
Over-consumption
As a consequence of treatment subsidies, Group B
individuals no longer pay the full costs of their care,
and so will be likely to consume more care than
necessary. For example, they may seek subsidised
medical care (or even reassurance) for minor
ailments, when they could pursue unsubsidised
treatments that are in total less costly. Or their care
providers, knowing that insurance pays for the
treatments, may order more tests or provide higher-
quality care than is necessary to effect a cure. To
recoup these additional costs, insurers must either
increase the premiums charged or reduce the
generosity of benefits paid. 
Patient co-payments are one way of ensuring
that the costs of inefficient over-consumption are at
least partially borne by those who cause them. If
patients face a charge each time they seek
treatment, then the tendency towards over-
consumption will be curbed and the increased
premium burden on Group A individuals (or their
premium subsidisers) will be less. However, co-
payments are a blunt instrument: they also impose
costs on the genuinely ill, who are not necessarily
over-consuming and who may not, in the presence
of co-payments, be able to afford sufficient care to
fully recover. 
Alternatively, the insurer may be able to reduce
costs by inducing care providers not to over-treat.
This is typically achieved by the insurer entering into
a separate contract with the patient’s chosen
provider that places some constraints upon how the
provider will be remunerated for services paid from
the patient’s insurance benefit. These supply-side
In a general sense,
it doesn’t matter 
to the insurer 
which particular
individuals fall ill.
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to predict total
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who falls ill, 
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they fall ill with,
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in premium- and
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cost-sharing contracts make the provider
responsible for some of the provider-controlled
costs that lead to over-consumption. If providers’
profits are reduced when they make inappropriate
costly decisions, then they have an incentive to make
fewer such decisions. Typical supply-side cost-
sharing instruments include utilisation review, price-
and-volume payments, and capitation-payment
regimes. 
Utilisation reviews typically involve a claw-back
of payments from the provider if too many or overly-
costly inappropriate treatments have been ordered.
Price and volume contracts pay providers a fixed
amount for a defined number of specified treatments
based upon pre-determined ‘best practice’
acceptable costs (for example, $X for Y hip-
replacement surgeries). If the provider chooses
more-costly treatment options, then profitability
drops. Capitation-payment regimes are used
extensively in primary care and are based upon
‘fixing’ a proportion of the provider’s income,
making it independent of the number of treatments
delivered. Typical capitation-payment regimes
consist of both a fixed payment per period per
patient ‘on the books’ (capitation) and a variable
component per consultation provided. The greater
the proportion of the provider’s income that is fixed,
the greater the impact on provider profits from
ordering overly-costly treatments or from scheduling
unnecessary visits, and the greater the incentives the
provider faces to offer preventive treatments that
reduce the likelihood of the patient making future
visits (which are costly to the provider). 
However, care must be taken when setting the
fixed and variable proportions of capitation-payment
regimes. If the fixed component is too high, and the
demand for visits is influenced by factors outside the
provider’s control (such as random increases in
demand arising from an unpreventable epidemic, or
the ‘bad luck’ of having a higher-than-average
number of high-need individuals on their books),
then the cost-saving incentives may be too acute.
Providers may make losses even though they adopt
best practice – and, in order to lower total costs and
maintain financial viability, they may respond by
reducing the quality of care below an acceptable
level. Empirical evidence from the United States
shows that considerable behavioural changes occur
when very-low-powered provider incentives are
employed (that is, only a small proportion of a
provider’s income is fixed). This suggests that
individual provider costs are strongly influenced by
many factors over which the provider has no
control.37 Furthermore, the ‘optimal’ capitation
formula will vary substantially amongst providers,
depending upon the differences in the underlying
health states of their patients. 
In practice, a combination of patient co-
payments and provider supply-side cost-sharing
contracts has been shown to offer the best chance of
achieving an optimal balancing of the system.38 This,
however, requires the insurer to be able to manage
all aspects of the payments for both Group A and
Group B individuals and for their service providers –
that is, the insurer must manage the setting of all
premium charges, all provider remuneration and all
patient co-payments.39 Optimal balancing will not be
possible if, for example, the provider can arbitrarily
charge the patient an out-of-pocket fee and the
insurer has neither knowledge of, nor the power to
determine, its size. 
Using private information to 
manipulate ‘the system’
The ability of an insurer to ‘balance’ contracts
optimally amongst all sector participants requires
knowledge of a given individual’s likely future
consumption of care – that is, some assessment of an
individual’s health state. If falling ill was truly
random, then there would be no way of predicting
future costs for a given individual, and individual
health state would be irrelevant. However, studies
suggest that only around 75% to 80% of the
variability in patients’ health costs is random, with
the best predictor of the remaining 20% to 25% being
an individual’s past consumption of healthcare.40
Thus, some knowledge of individual characteristics
will assist insurers in predicting which Group A
individuals will be more likely to become Group B
individuals in any period, enabling more accurate
trade-offs between specific Group A and Group B
individuals to be made. 
However, if likely high-consuming individuals
can conceal their likely greater costs, then they will
pay lower premiums than is efficient – which makes
it necessary to charge higher premiums to all
individuals. This means low-cost individuals who can
confirm their low-cost type41 have an incentive to
join an insurance scheme that excludes individuals
who cannot offer credible proof of their cost type,
and that has lower premium costs. The outcome is a
bifurcation between high-cost high-risk insurance
pools and low-cost low-risk insurance pools – and, at
worst, some high-cost individuals becoming
‘uninsurable’ by any scheme. Furthermore, profit-
maximising insurers with access to both population-
37 Ching-To Albert Ma and Thomas G
McGuire. 2002 (see footnote 24).
38 Ibid.
39 Martin Gaynor, Deborah Haas-Wilson
and William Vogt. 2001. ‘Are invisible
hands good hands? Moral hazard,
competition, and the second-best in
health care markets’ Journal of Political
Economy 108(5) pp992-1005. 
40 Other characteristics such as age, gender,
ethnicity and income provide additional
predictability, but are less significant than
past consumption. See: James C
Robinson. 2004. ‘Reinvention of health
insurance in the consumer era’ Journal of
the American Medical Association
291(15) pp1880-1886.
41 For example, their claims history might
show a low volume of claims, or they may
be willing to pay high co-payments.
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based and individual information can use their
greater knowledge about the likelihood of a given
individual falling ill to charge premiums higher than
the level of risk borne, thereby extracting profits in
excess of a fair return. For example, a fund manager
may know that the pool being managed is of lower
risk than the total population, but may charge
premiums as if the pool risk is average, thereby
receiving premiums in excess of costs. 
Behaviour that leads to such separation of risk
pools is known as ‘cream-skimming’. As ‘cream-
skimming’ impinges upon the pursuit of both
efficiency and equity, in many jurisdictions health
insurance is subject to regulatory oversight designed
to minimise its effects. Alternatively, health
insurance may be provided by one government-
owned insurer with the power to make membership
compulsory. In this case, no individual or firm can
benefit from the use of private information.
However, as with all monopolies, a single provider
faces few pressures to constrain costs, so premiums
will likely be higher than ideal. A further alternative
is competition between nonprofit or mutual
insurance providers.42 In principle, these organi-
sations offer some protection against insurance
provider cream-skimming, as any profits made from
excessively high premiums can be used only for the
benefit of the premium-payers,43 and competition
between firms reduces the ability of self-interested
managers to extract surpluses in the form of salaries
and perquisites. However, they offer no protection
from individuals using private information to skew
insurance-pool risk profiles. 
The downside of premium subsidies
When a Group A individual’s premium is subsidised,
there is a breaking of the direct nexus between the
full cost of the individual’s premium, the cost of care,
and the individual’s behaviour. Unless the insurer
has access to information about other contractual
interactions between the premium subsidiser and
the Group A individual, the ability to achieve optimal
balancing of all stakeholders’ interests is lost.
Balancing is especially difficult if the premium
subsidiser and the insurer are one, and if Group A
individuals’ contributions are levied not on the basis
of likely future healthcare costs but on another basis
(such as income, on which the tax system is based). 
When Group A individuals’ payments are
unrelated to their health risks, their behaviour may
be influenced by factors other than their health state
and healthcare costs. For example, individuals
paying high taxes may be (as Group B individuals)
more likely to over-consume or expect higher-
quality care than individuals who pay lower taxes,
because the higher-taxed individuals perceive that
they have paid proportionately more of the costs of
the scheme and so are entitled to more of the
services. Moreover, the insurer has no recourse to
individual financial incentives as a means of
encouraging prevention activities (such as smoking
cessation) by individuals who pay no taxes or co-
payments and who therefore will receive both
insurance and treatment at no financial cost. Both
these types of individuals will be likely to consume
more services than is optimal44 – and the system will
be less efficient than it would if customised
individual signals could be used to alter individual
consumer behaviour. 
Information asymmetries 
favour providers
Arrow further identifies that, in addition to insurance
factors, information asymmetries in the markets for
the provision of care delivery also affect the
efficiency of the system. Healthcare practitioners are
highly skilled experts, whilst patients are generally
not. Healthcare is an ‘experience’ or ‘credence’ good
which cannot be easily examined and tested before
purchase. Furthermore, it is fully ‘used up’ when
purchased, so it is difficult to independently assess
its qualities. Consequently, providers have
significant scope to knowingly overcharge and/or
deliver low-quality care without this being detected.
This leads to a potential loss of trust between
providers and patients, and to the consumption of
healthcare being-less-than optimal. 
Industry regulation, professional registration
processes, competency audits, and compulsory
education go some way towards assuring patients
that minimum levels of practitioner skill apply.
Mechanisms such as codes of professional ethics,
personal professional reputation, and nonprofit and
mutual-ownership organisational forms offer some
imperfect constraints on practitioner overcharging
and quality/price arbitrage. Despite these measures,
there is considerable room for practitioner discretion
that leads to less-than-optimal outcomes. 
The information-asymmetry problems are
further exacerbated when the purchaser of care
(insurance company, government, charity donor) is
not the recipient. This is due to the difficulty in
ascertaining whether the care actually delivered was
of the type and quality agreed, and whether it was
delivered to the intended recipients. Nonprofit
ownership form has been offered as a ‘solution’ to
To achieve optimal
balancing of the
system, the insurer
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the setting of 
all premium
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all provider
remuneration, 
and all patient 
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Optimal balancing
will not be possible
if the provider can
arbitrarily charge
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an out-of-pocket
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42 Henry Hansman. 1996. The Ownership
of Enterprise. Harvard University Press.
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
43 Presuming that the decision-making
powers of the non-profit or cooperative
insurance company are vested in the
members or in individuals directly
accountable to the members. See: Avner
Ben-Ner and Theresa van Hoomissen.
1991. ‘Nonprofit organizations in the
mixed economy: a demand and supply
analysis’ Annals of Public and
Cooperative Economics 62(4) pp519-50. 
44 Education programmes may increase the
preventive activities of these individuals –
but, unless the programmes are very
tightly targeted, the risk exists that too
much will be spent on education, as the
education is delivered both to those
individuals who already face incentives
and to those who do not. 
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the ‘problem’ of for-profit providers exploiting the
asymmetry for their own financial benefit, but it is a
very weak constraint on such behaviour.45 For
example, rather than extracting cash profits, a
nonprofit provider may choose to provide a higher
quality of care than the third-party purchaser
intends, because delivering this quality of care is
more satisfying to the provider.46 Consequently,
contractual incentives and monitoring (including
regulatory reporting requirements) that specifically
address the exploitative potential of information
asymmetry between purchaser and recipient are a
prominent feature in the design of healthcare
systems, irrespective of the ownership and organisa-
tional form of the providers.47
Are patients vulnerable to being ‘locked in’?
Primary healthcare differs from other types of
healthcare. As the first point of contact for a patient,
the primary healthcare provider stands as a
gatekeeper to other services (hospital, specialist
care, pharmaceuticals, laboratory tests). Further-
more, unlike what happens in specialist and hospital
care, primary care providers and their patients
repeatedly interact. 
An individual typically has two sorts of
contractual arrangements with a primary care
provider – an ‘access’ agreement (whereby the
provider agrees to treat the individual in the future
when illness occurs) and a ‘usage’ agreement (which
governs the provision of services when care is
sought for a specific illness). The terms of these
agreements may be negotiated directly between the
individual and the provider, or by the insurer on the
individual’s behalf. These agreements are distinct
from the contracts that the individual has with the
insurer for risk management. 
Typically, patients prefer to have a long-
standing access contract with a single primary care
provider because primary healthcare is a highly
customised personal service, with outcomes often
determined by hard-to-measure qualities such as the
match between the practitioner’s communication
style and the patient’s receptiveness to that style.
The costs for patients of finding a satisfactory match
on these dimensions are high, as different practi-
tioners and patients prioritise different dimensions of
quality. Several consultations are usually required to
assess the fit, so the patient will most likely settle for
the first ‘acceptable’ provider they find, even though
a better match may exist. This raises the risk that the
patient will become ‘locked in’ to that practitioner
because of the substantial costs and low probability
of finding a better match. The ‘acceptable’ practi-
tioner can now raise prices or reduce quality within
the margins of the patient’s search costs, without
fear of the patient taking their custom to another
practitioner.48
Consequently, different contractual and
regulatory arrangements are required in primary
healthcare than in other parts of the health sector.
Reputation and repeat custom may mitigate some of
the complications arising from provider patient
information asymmetries, in particular the consistent
delivery of low-quality care. If even one patient
detects and can communicate the presence of low-
quality care, the provider risks losing all patients who
care about this dimension of quality. Primary care
providers who value reputation thus have incentives
to repeatedly deliver such care at a consistent level
of quality to all patients – and to a greater degree
than if each treatment was a discrete episode. 
However, in order to ensure the provider exerts
sufficient effort in building and maintaining personal
reputation in the valued dimensions, it may be
necessary for the practitioner to be the owner of the
firm through which services are delivered – that is,
the provider ‘owns’ the ‘list’ of patients with whom
the access agreements have been made, and also
the capital gains and professional satisfaction that
ownership of this list confers. As the returns from a
personal reputation are not easily specified in a
contract,49 most primary care providers opt to
practise as individuals rather than in partnership or
as salaried employees. This arrangement reinforces
patient preferences for provider continuity. Practice
ownership ‘locks in’ the provider to a specific patient
community, thereby providing certainty that the
usage agreements will be overseen by the chosen
‘acceptable’ provider.50 Such certainty is not
necessarily achievable when the access agreement is
between a patient and a multi-provider firm.
The challenge: balancing the
interests of all participants 
The principal objective of healthcare policy should
be to foster the creation of a sector capable of
delivering the best health outcomes possible for all
individuals within the constraints of available
funding. This requires assurances that the worst
consequences of information asymmetries between
providers and patients are ameliorated, and that the
achievement of better outcomes is supported by the
ways in which insurance contracts ‘balance’ the
interests of all participants. 
Healthcare 
is a good 
that cannot be
easily examined
and tested 
before purchase. 
45 Avner Ben-Ner and Theresa van
Hoomissen. 1991 (see footnote 43).
46 Richard Steinberg. 1993. ‘Public policy
and the performance of nonprofit
organizations: a general framework’
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector
Quarterly 22(1) pp13-31. 
47 Jeremiah Hurley. 2000.  ‘An overview
of the economics of the health sector’
Chapter 2 in A Culyer and J Newhouse
(eds) (see footnote 18).
48 This is a feature of monopolistically
competitive markets, of which primary
healthcare is only one example. See:
David Dranove and Mark
Satterthwaite. 2000 (see footnote 18). 
49 Oliver Hart. 2003. ‘Incomplete
Contracts and Public Ownership:
Remarks, and an Application to Public-
Private Partnerships’ Economic Journal
113(486) ppC69-76. 
50 For example, in most after-hours
treatment agreements, the ‘after-
hours’ provider treats the patient
under an agreement in which the
provider with the access agreement
subcontracts usage-provision responsi-
bility to the substitute, in respect of
patients on the access provider’s ‘list’,
for a defined time period. 
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A specific challenge, however, attends how the
insurance arrangements interpret the pursuit of
‘equity’. Insurers face two specific equity challenges.
First, on what basis do they allocate treatment
benefits amongst Group B individuals? Second, on
what basis do they allocate the costs amongst Group
A individuals? In principle, Group B individuals who
are equally ill would be likely to expect equal
benefits, irrespective of premium payments made,
as it is development of the defined health state that
has made them Group B individuals in the first place.
However, a government-owned insurer may use the
treatment-allocation process to redistribute wealth
(for example, paying different treatment benefits to
individuals with different incomes). Likewise, a
government ‘sponsor’ may use socially-motivated
rather than health-state-motivated bases for
applying premium subsidies. 
These characteristics of health systems suggest
that, in the design of health policies, it is the design
of the insurance arrangements that will have the
most significant effect on the ability to achieve the
desired outcomes. Therefore aspects of insurance
design will be the most important determinants of
the ability of different systems to deliver the desired
outcomes in all dimensions. 
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4. The NZPHCS Managed-Care Scheme
No policy is ever implemented in a vacuum. The
existing arrangements must be taken into consid-
eration when assessing both the likely outcomes and
the transition to those outcomes – and the NZPHCS
is no exception to this. The framework shown in
Figure 2 on page 7 enables the design and
implementation of the NZPHCS to be assessed
against the pre-NZPHCS arrangements. This section
carries out that assessment. 
The 1938 ‘social contract’ 
The defining characteristic of the pre-NZPHCS
primary healthcare markets was the ‘social contract’
arising from the 1938 Social Security Act. This
legislation was introduced by a government that
wanted to provide ‘free-to-the-patient’ healthcare,
as subsequently adopted in England’s NHS. Because
of concerted opposition from the medical
profession, however, a ‘compromise’ was reached:
the government agreed to own and fund the entities
that provided hospital, maternity and mental health
services, whilst privately owned general practi-
tioners (GPs) provided primary healthcare services
and were part-funded by fee-for-service taxpayer-
funded ‘Section 88’ subsidies.51 Under this
arrangement, privately owned primary healthcare
providers retained the right to charge patients the
difference between government subsidies and the
costs of service delivery. 
The 1938 arrangements saw the government
both funding and operating a universal insurance
scheme on behalf of all citizens. The ‘Section 88’
payments were insurance benefits (treatment
subsidies) paid in respect only of those Group B
individuals who fell ill and required care; eligible
individuals (Group A) received implicit premium
subsidies from taxation; and the government, as
insurer, underwrote the variations arising from
demand uncertainty (the costs of higher-than-
anticipated demand were met from the tax pool).
Providers faced no financial consequences of patient
demand uncertainty as they were fully remunerated
for each service provided, by a combination of the
Section 88 and patient payments. 
As patient out-of-pocket payments were not
determined by the government insurer, the
arrangements fell somewhat short of an ideal
insurance arrangement where the insurer can
optimally trade off the interests of Group A and
Group B individuals, providers, and the premium
subsidisers (see Figure 2). The integration of the
premium subsidiser and insurer, the budget-based
taxation funding of the insurance scheme, and the
absence of a clearly defined premium charge all
posed further difficulties in achieving optimal trade-
offs. However, government ownership/operation of
a single insurance hub and private individual-practi-
tioner ownership of the firms that provided care
were both theoretically consistent with
arrangements likely to reduce costs and eliminate
some of the worst individual ‘problems’ of each of
the insurance and care-provision elements of the
system. That is, all individuals had some defined-
benefit primary healthcare insurance funded by
taxation, and owner-provider GPs faced reputation
incentives to provide consistent and high-quality
services to patients making repeated visits. Explicit
sector-specific regulation (such as practitioner
registration, codes of ethics, and competency
audits) addressed many of the information-
asymmetry ‘problems’ in care delivery.
Initially, the ‘Section 88’ payments covered
most of the costs of primary healthcare. By the late
1980s, however, inflation and the failure of
successive governments to adjust ‘Section 88’
payments meant that the insurance benefit covered
only a very small proportion of GP charges. In 1991,
the insurance coverage terms were altered.
Treatment benefits for high-income adults were
stopped. These individuals now had no insurance –
they ‘self insured’ (paid the full costs of primary care,
and hence underwrote their own demand
uncertainty). The government-operated insurance
scheme paid treatment subsidies only for low-
income individuals52 and children under six (which
amounted to around 47% of the population), even
though all individuals contributed through taxation
to these treatment subsidies. Nonetheless, the fee-
for-service treatment-subsidy benefits that were
paid were substantially more generous than when
the scheme was universal. 
The NZPHCS ‘insurance markets’
By contrast, under the NZPHCS arrangements,
PHOs assume the role of insurers. Government
capitation payments to the PHOs are insurance-
premium-subsidy payments. These premium
subsidies are partially risk-rated according to a
PHO’s characteristics53 and partially risk-rated by
individual health states.54 The government’s
The NZPHCS
requires providers
to bear more risk
than before. With
capitation
payments based
on average costs,
half of the
PHOs/providers
will have surpluses
– the other half will
have deficits.
51 Toni Ashton. ‘Recent developments in
the funding and organisation of the New
Zealand health system’ Australia and New
Zealand Health Policy 2005 pp2-9
(available online at www.anzhealth
policy.com/content/2/1/9).
52 As determined by CSC eligibility.
53 That is: the ethnicity, age, and income
profile of the majority of Group A individ-
uals, and the number of Group A individ-
uals, registered with the PHO.
54 As indicated by the number of Group A
individuals registered with that PHO who
possess a HUHC. 
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financial liability is fixed by the number of registered
individuals in total, and is independent of
individuals’ primary healthcare demand variations.
Any costs associated with underwriting the variation
in patient demand now become the responsibility of
the PHOs. PHO insurers must manage both demand
variability (insurance) and care coordination/
delivery. 
The treatment benefits paid in respect of Group
B individuals are now determined by the contracts
that the PHO enters into with service providers.
Conceptually, these payments may take any form
that the PHO managers and directors decide upon,
and ideally would comprise a mix of the variety of
instruments55 that insurers have available for
constraining providers’ cost-causing behaviour and
‘balancing’ the interests of all sector participants. In
practice, the ‘back-to-back’ agreement offered by
the Independent Practitioners Association Council
(IPAC) as a model for PHO-provider contracts56
requires that all care-delivery capitation payments
(the GMS/Nurse subsidies in Table 1 on page 4) be
‘passed on’ direct to service providers. Any
shortfall57 between the capitation premium-
subsidies and the costs of providing services is made
up by the out-of-pocket payments of Group B
individuals to service providers when they fall ill. 
Providers become de facto insurers
The NZPHCS replaces the single government-
owned insurance hub with at least 81 private-sector
insurers that have registered populations of between
3,200 and 333,000 (median 18,700) and that
compete with each other within each DHB area.
However, the ‘passing through’ of the capitation
payments means that the variation in patient
demand in most instances is managed by approxi-
mately 3000 individual GPs, with patient pools of
between 1200 and 2000 registered patients. These
pools are substantially smaller than the primary-care
pools of 25,000 recommended in the United States
as the minimum size for avoiding adverse financial
risks to practitioners. The contractual arrangements
have thus resulted in service providers with
extremely small patient pools becoming ‘de facto
insurers’. This poses some significant challenges for
efficient risk management in the ‘upstream’
insurance part of the system, relative to the single
insurance pool pre-NZPHCS. 
Without any cream-skimming, half the
PHOs/providers will have registered population
bases ‘healthier’ than the population average and
half less healthy than the average. The smaller the
PHO/provider’s base, the greater the likelihood that
its registered patient health-state average will be
substantially different from the total population
average upon which capitation premiums are based.
As capitation premiums and patient out-of-pocket
charges are based on average costs, there will be in
any time period half the PHOs/providers with
surpluses (income in excess of costs) and half with
deficits (costs exceed income). Furthermore, the
higher the proportion of income that a
PHO/provider receives from capitation, the more
exposed the individual PHO/provider will be to the
financial costs of deviations from average. If demand
is correlated across time and space (highly likely,
given the geographical limitations placed upon PHO
formation), then some PHOs/providers will be
habitually in surplus and some habitually in deficit. 
The substantially smaller NZPHCS risk pools
will lead to substantially larger risk-management
costs. Unlike in the single centralised pre-NZPHCS
system, there is no provision for using surpluses
from the ‘healthy’ PHOs/providers to cover losses
arising in the ‘less healthy’ PHOs/providers. As
PHOs are nonprofit entities, with no accumulated
funds and no shareholders to underwrite the
financial variations that arise, and because the
NZPHCS makes no provision for the development of
reinsurance markets that would enable
PHOs/providers to insure against the variations, the
only entities able to manage the variation are
contracted providers. 
However, contracted providers are principally
private for-profit providers. It is unlikely that they will
voluntarily underwrite this cost, especially given that
they have the right to charge patients. The most
likely scenario is that, to make up the shortfall in their
incomes that arises from risk management activities,
they will charge their patients – thereby replicating
their pre-NZPHCS financial-risk status. Those private
providers who make surpluses face no impediments
to removing the surpluses as dividends. Surpluses
arising from ‘luck’ in one year (for example, a lower
demand than usual) can be withdrawn as profits
rather than applied to future risk management (such
as higher demand in subsequent years). Even if
providers were subject to regulation, it is highly
unlikely that such withdrawals could be avoided.
The informational difficulty in determining what is a
fair return, given that each ‘fair return’ will vary with
the variations in patients’ health states, means that
the limited provisions in the NZPHCS for DHBs to
impose price restraints will be extremely difficult to
implement. Even in the mature United States health-
55 Such as patient co-payments, supply-side
cost-sharing contracts with providers,
and premium contributions levied on
Group A individuals.
56 (www.ipac.org.nz/members/
contracts/PHO-GP%20Back-to-
Back%20Contract.pdf)
57 That is, the ‘top-up’ that ensures total
primary healthcare spending from all
sources equals the total costs of care
provided plus PHO operating costs. 
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insurance markets, these issues handicap regulators
overseeing very small provider-insurers.58
Patients registered at habitually loss-making
PHOs/providers will therefore have to pay higher
fees, simply because they are ‘unlucky’ enough to be
registered at a less-healthy PHO/provider.
Meanwhile, the ‘lucky’ providers are able to reap
dividends that arise as a consequence of natural
variations in the distribution of patient health states.
The government’s expectation is that the nonprofit
status of PHOs will prevent funds designated for
healthcare from being extracted as provider
dividends – but the design of NZPHCS contracts gifts
profits to half the providers (and guarantees that
higher average costs will result) simply because the
single more-efficient insurer has been dismantled
into approximately 3000 substantially less-efficient
insurers. 
Cream-skimming potential
Because population-based characteristics are likely
to be poor estimators of actual demand uncertainty,
there is provision for higher capitation payments for
those individuals assessed ex ante to be at higher
risk. Nonetheless, variations in health states and
patient payments will be significant – even between
identically subsidised PHOs/providers. Incentives
for cream-skimming will increase substantially under
the NZPHCS, as the incomes of PHOs and their care-
provider agents are now critically dependent upon
variations in registered patient health states. 
PHOs and service providers possess the
historic information that enables the best predictions
of likely future health consumption, and hence likely
financial risk, to be made. Pre-NZPHCS, there were
few incentives for cream-skimming. Providers were
paid for each treatment delivered, irrespective of the
underlying health state of the individual seeking
treatment. Cream-skimming incentives open up the
potential for even greater variations of patient distri-
bution – and hence even greater likelihood of
entrenched surpluses in some PHOs/providers, with
a consequent distortion of the average health states
of the other PHOs/providers. If cream-skimming is
undertaken by even one PHO or provider, then this
skews the risk profile of the remaining
PHOs/providers; they become relatively high risk,
and so their charges to the patients of
PHOs/providers will be higher than otherwise.
Whilst higher premium subsidies for HUHC holders
may mitigate some of the effects of correlated
demand, over time these payments too will become
population-based ‘Care Plus’ payments and will be
determined by the PHO/provider’s overall
population characteristics (rather than being
transferable with the individual). Indeed, HUHC
status or previous eligibility for Care Plus funding
may provide additional tools that enable
PHOs/providers to discriminate between individuals
even when no individual history is available.
Moreover, HUHC and Care Plus are designed for
only a small proportion of the population – the
distortions from high costs may arise from
individuals requiring more treatment than the
average, but less than that required for eligibility for
additional funding. 
Because there is a policy expectation that
patient charges will decrease with premium
subsidies being passed through directly to the
patients concerned as decreases in patient
payments,59 service providers will be required to
bear proportionately more financial risk when higher
capitation subsidies are extended to more groups in
the population. The more of the provider’s income
that comes from capitation payments, the more the
provider’s income will be affected by the random
variations in health states that the provider cannot
control. This increases the incentives for cream-
skimming even further. Consequently, PHOs/
providers with ‘poorer than average’ or ‘worried
well’ health-state individuals on their books must
either raise charges to the remaining low-subsidised
individuals60 or lower their care quality. The only
other alternative is to request capitation increases
from government for all patients. 
If capitation payments are increased further, the
additional costs will be borne by all citizens (through
taxes). The ‘lucky’ and cream-skimming PHOs/
providers within each class (Interim and Access) will
become even more profitable as increased capitation
payments are applied to all providers. If increased
capitation payments are not forthcoming, charges to
patients at the ‘unlucky’ PHOs/providers must rise,
enabling the ‘lucky’ and cream-skimming providers
to similarly increase their patient fees and thereby
increase their profits. If care quality is reduced to
meet costs, then ‘unlucky’ PHOs/providers must
reduce the quality of care to the patients who are
already the unhealthiest, whilst the healthier (on
average) patients of ‘lucky’ and cream-skimming
PHOs/providers enjoy relatively higher-quality care.
In all instances, the rewards for ‘luck’ and cream-
skimming are substantial. And they are contrary to
NZPHCS objectives of reducing health disparities
between populations. 
Patients registered
at habitually 
loss-making
PHOs/providers
will have to pay
higher fees, simply
because they’re
‘unlucky’ enough to
be registered at a
PHO/provider 
that has 
sicker-than-average 
patient lists.
58 Gary Hagen. 1999. ‘Shaky Ground:
questioning health plan and provider
solvency’ Risk Management 46(11) pp42-
45. 
59 This expectation confuses ‘average
premium’ with ‘average consumption
subsidy’. Figure 2 on page 7 shows that
these are not directly comparable:
premiums are paid for all registered
individuals but ‘consumption subsidies’
are paid only in respect of the subset
falling ill. It also does not take into
account the distribution of consumption:
survey evidence suggests nearly 20% of
New Zealanders have not visited a doctor
in the past 12 months, a large number
have made a small number of visits, and a
few have made many visits. 
60 This effectively has low-subsidised
individuals cross-subsidise the ‘poorer
than average’ and the ‘worried well’ over-
consumption of the higher-subsidised.
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Whilst PHOs/providers might be able to merge
to form larger patient bases and so spread financial
risks, the mitigating effects of such activity are
limited because mergers must occur within DHB
boundaries. Furthermore, mergers are likely to occur
only amongst PHOs/providers with the sickest
patient bases, as profitable PHOs/providers would
be unwilling to sacrifice profits or the higher quality
of care they can deliver. The likely outcome, within
each DHB, will be a small number of very large
sicker-than-average PHOs/providers and a large
number of small PHOs/providers with healthier-
than-average patient bases. This is not unlike the
United States insurance markets, which are
demarcated between the large government-
subsidised Medicare/Medicaid and private insurers.
In New Zealand, however, the bifurcation will occur
at the level of service providers, because the
providers are the ‘de facto insurers’.
Out-of-pocket payments will vary – even more
As a consequence of the insurance arrangements,
the variation in patient out-of-pocket payments
under the NZPHCS will be substantially greater than
those under the pre-NZPHCS system, with the
variations most likely being largest amongst the
PHOs/providers that have the smallest registered
populations. Both total costs and fees charged to
some population groups are also likely to be greater
than under the pre-NZPHCS system, despite higher
subsidies in total. Patient payments will vary
according to the health states of the entire
PHO’s/provider’s registered patient base, the
cream-skimming activities of PHO managers and
their contracted service-provider agents, and the
degree to which surpluses are ‘inadvertently’
extracted as either profits or higher-than-average
quality of care. 
Patient payments now include not just the
difference between the provider’s costs and the
average subsidy. They also include a component
related to variation in patient demand (risk
management). The pre-NZPHCS risk-management
component, managed by the government from
taxation revenue, was both smaller (overall) and
opaque (to patients). Under the NZPHCS, this cost is
both larger overall and explicitly priced into patient
charges. As government subsidies increase, both
the tax burden to all citizens and the charges to
those patients not yet included in the higher-
subsidised groupings will increase. 
Moreover, the charges to patients whose
capitation payments do increase will not fall
uniformly, as the charges too are determined by the
distribution of patient health-states and by patient
consumption-behaviour. As the patient out-of-
pocket payments under the NZPHCS are paid only
by those patients consuming health services, these
charges will be borne disproportionately by the
subset who fall sick and consume services (Group
B), rather than being spread across all patients
(Group A) in the form of an ex-ante premium
payment or insurer-determined co-payments (as
occurs in typical managed-care schemes).61 Mean-
while, the ‘usually well’ in the higher-capitated
categories, who are most likely to increase their
‘worried well’ consumption in the face of lower out-
of-pocket charges, consume even more care. This
further exacerbates the size of fee increases charged
to the frequently ill in all patient pools – and
especially to those in pools with lower-than-average
health states. 
There is inadequate information about both
individual New Zealanders’ health states and the
extent to which these could be used for predicting
likely health costs and allocating the costs efficiently
and equitably between individuals and the state.62
For example, the difficulties of setting actuarially fair
premium subsidies and patient co-payments was a
principal reason given for not adopting the three to
four competitive comprehensive (primary,
secondary and tertiary) private-sector health-
insurance firms proposed in the Green Paper and the
White Paper in 1991. Thus the Ministry of Health’s
‘surprising’ finding that, on average, the payments
made by patients of those providers who were not
yet part of the NZPHCS were lower than the higher-
subsidised NZPHCS providers,63 and the Minister’s
disappointment that patient co-payments have not
fallen as much as anticipated amongst the newly-
subsidised groups, are not so puzzling.64
The real risk of ‘passing the buck’
Managed-care schemes utilise a combination of
fiscal incentives and practice strategies to alter
provider behaviours in order to induce the desired
outcomes. Fiscal incentives are embodied in the
contracts between the insurance hub and the service
providers on the ‘care delivery’ side of the system.
Fiscal incentives expose providers to financial risk:
by adopting a set of behaviours desirable to the
managed-care entity, financial risk to the provider is
reduced. However, if the provider can set the terms
of patient payments, then any fiscal incentives in the
contract with the managed-care entity are able to be
‘undone’ by the provider’s simply charging the
If capitation
payments are
increased further,
the additional
costs will be borne
by all citizens
(through taxes).
The ‘lucky’
PHOs/providers
will become even
more profitable. 
61 The NHS avoids the ‘ill patient charging
cross-subsidy’ by precluding patient
payments. But the difference in care
quality between Primary Care Trusts
(PCTs) prevails, and concerns have been
raised about the extent to which PCTs
can ‘cream-skim’. See: Christopher Ham.
2004 (see footnote 30).
62 Toni Ashton. 1999. ‘The health reforms:
to market and back’ in J Boston, P Dalziel
and S St John (eds) Redesigning the
Welfare State in New Zealand: Problems,
Policies and Prospects. Oxford University
Press. Auckland, New Zealand. 
63 CBG Health Research Limited. 2004.
National GP Fee Survey. Ministry of
Health (available online at
www.moh.govt.nz; search under
document name).
64 Minister of Health. 2004 (see footnote
31).
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patient a fee. The fee eliminates the financial risk that
the managed-care entity is using to educe the
desired behaviour, and the provider ends up bearing
no financial risk. Therefore, managed-care contracts
utilising fiscal incentives typically remunerate
providers through contracts that preclude the
provider from setting the patients’ fees. 
The capitation ‘pass through’ contracts, and the
freedom that GPs have retained (since 1938) to levy
charges directly on patients, have two significant
and costly consequences for the NZPHCS. Firstly,
the arrangements lead to the effective dismantling of
most of the benefits of insurance markets in
healthcare – leading to higher costs in total, and to
very large variation in the prices paid by patients.
Secondly, the right of GPs to levy patient charges
removes any ability for PHOs to use fiscal
instruments to encourage or constrain provider
behaviour. Thus, PHOs are denied use of the fiscal
instruments normally available to managed-care
entities for inducing desired outcomes. 
These consequences call into question the
rationale for the NZPHCS use of capitation payments
for care delivery, and indeed even the managed-care
model itself. As long as providers can set patient
charges autonomously, PHOs are confined to using
only practice-based strategies to induce desired
practitioner-behaviour changes. They have no
institutional capacity for managing financial risk.
Whilst they can control costs in relation to patient
registration and administrative activities (including
practice-based managed-care strategies), they have
no option but to pass on any financial risks to
providers. The providers can then pass on the
consequences of the financial risk to patients.
Capitation funding for PHO management and for
services to increase access may be justified, because
these activities are entirely within the control of
PHOs/providers. But, under current provider-
charging rights, capitation funding of GMS and
nurse subsidies for care delivery (which is subject to
many sources of variation outside the
PHOs’/providers’ control) has led to very costly and
inequitable fiscal consequences. 
If PHOs are to act as effective managed-care
entities, and if they are to deliver more efficient
and/or equitable outcomes, they must be able to
constrain provider fee-setting behaviour. They must
also be free to set the degree of fiscal incentives
imposed on providers in a manner consistent with
the degree of financial risk to which each provider is
exposed (as a consequence of the distribution of
patients’ health states and demand patterns). United
States experience shows that very small fiscal
incentives yield large changes in provider behaviour;
yet the standard ‘back-to-back’ contract implies that
the objective of the NZPHCS is to move progres-
sively towards the imposition on providers of the
strongest of all fiscal incentives – full capitation
payment. Substantially more efficient outcomes
could be achieved by either removing the provider’s
right to set charges (thereby granting PHOs the
ability, or even the obligation, to act as both insurer
and care manager) or removing capitation payments
for care delivery and reinstating ‘Section 88’
payments (thereby restoring the insurance role to a
single government provider whilst retaining the
practice management benefits achieved from PHO
service coordination). As it stands, the current
arrangement leads to the most costly insurance
arrangements, and to substantially less than effective
managed-care activities. 
If PHOs are to act
as effective
managed-care
entities, 
they must be able
to constrain
providers’ 
fee-setting
behaviour.
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Competition, in its general sense, is the dynamic process by which
institutions interact with each other to produce and exchange goods
and services. Contracts embody the agreements reached between
interacting institutions. The principles guiding interaction are that
each participant will voluntarily enter into a new contract if doing so
improves the participant’s outcome. However, the interacting
institutions are themselves ‘bundles’ of contracts embodying the
arrangements by which individuals and other institutions agree to
participate jointly in the production and exchange of goods and
services. These contract ‘bundles’ are generally termed the
institution’s ‘governance’ arrangements. 
Similarly, the governance contracts in place at any one point in
time within an institution are the outcome of a dynamic process of
interaction. Furthermore, the interactions between institutions and
the interactions between an institution’s governance arrangements
are interdependent. A change in the relationships within an
institution will alter the agreements reached between the institution
and another entity; a change in the relationships between entities has
implications for the governance arrangements within each of these
entities. Moreover, the entire set of interactions may differ according
to the over-arching rules (the regulatory environment) that govern
the sector. 
The interactions between entities and the governance
arrangements within entities both have substantial implications for
Competition and governance ... 
5. Competing for Governance
This section analyses the implications of the
contractual, regulatory and governance changes of
the NZPHCS on sector outcomes. The analysis
recognises that any change is implemented in the
context of an existing set of contractual and
governance arrangements. It also recognises that
these existing arrangements will be fundamental to
shaping both the dynamic interactions of partic-
ipants, and the arrangements and institutions that
ensue. The ability of the NZPHCS to deliver on its
objectives will be determined by the ways in which
the existing participants and institutions respond
dynamically to the contractual changes that the
NZPHCS introduces, when they form new
institutions, alliances and contractual interactions. 
The 1990s: a period of innovation
and change 
The 1990s was a period of great change in New
Zealand primary healthcare. The realisation that
government primary healthcare spending had fallen
substantially led to ‘Section 88’ subsidy changes in
1991,65 and to a growing awareness that government
funding ought to be available to a wider range of
provider types. The 1990s changes also reflected a
movement away from a ‘universal subsidy
entitlement’ approach to primary care funding, and
towards targeted spending to reduce disparities in
health outcomes between populations.66
When four Regional Health Authorities were
established in 1994,67 substantial additional government
funding was made available for primary healthcare
services offered by all provider types. Regional
management of these funds allowed letting of contracts
that catered to specific local needs. This appears to have
resulted in a period of vibrant innovation and
competition in primary healthcare services, with
providers of all types developing new service-delivery
models in order to secure the additional funding. These
contracts were typically let on the basis of either a fixed
budget (to meet all demand of a given type) or
capitation (per identified-member serviced), thereby
limiting the financial risk for the government whilst the
new services were evaluated.68
Where communities of specific interest or need
identified a way to meet that need, then new entities
were often formed to enter into contracts for the
additional funds. Two general types of entities
emerged – those based upon specific consumer
characteristics (such as iwi, Pacific Island groups, or
trade-union membership) and those based upon
provider characteristics (for example, trusts formed as
operational arms of Independent Practitioner
Associations [IPAs]). Because the new funding
provided an opportunity for the development of new
service-delivery models in competition with the
general-practitioner ‘Section 88’ payment model, the
former were the first to form. They tended to be
consumer-governed nonprofit entities that provided a
range of services and either employed health profes-
sionals as salaried employees or contracted for their
services. These consumer-governed entities have also
provided a prototype for the NZPHCS’s PHO model.69
As the new consumer-governed entities began
competing with general practitioners (GPs) for
patients, the GPs too were forced to innovate.
Two types of PHOs
have emerged:
genuinely
consumer-
governed PHOs;
and PHOs oriented
around providers.
65 See the previous section (4. The
NZPHCS Managed-Care Scheme).
66 Jackie Cumming. 1999. Funding
Population-Based Primary Health Care in
New Zealand: Report prepared for the
National Health Committee (available
online at www.nhc.govt.nz/
publications/phc/phcfunding.pdf).
67 These were merged into a single Health
Funding Authority after the 1996
election.
68 Laurence Malcolm, Lyn Wright and
Pauline Barnett. 1999 (see footnote 13). 
69 Gregor Coster and Barry Gribben. 1999
(see footnote 9).
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the types of goods produced and exchanged, and for the costs and
prices of production and exchange. For example, when there are many
potential buyers and sellers, each seller must pay attention to the
relative cost and quality of goods they produce, in order to attract
buyers. This leads to continual innovation in both production methods
and product variety. When there are few sellers or a restricted number
of buyers, however, such innovation will be less intense. Costs may be
higher and product variety lower, because less attention needs to be
paid to these elements. 
Furthermore, the nature of interaction between institutions may
lead to innovation in the governance arrangements of the respective
institutions. When different individuals are involved in the institution’s
governance, costs of production may be lower or levels of innovation
higher, and the nature of interaction in the markets over the sale of
goods and the ensuing contracts may be different – for example, over-
high prices charged by a monopolist may be constrained if the
consumers of the firm become the owners and set the terms of
contracts for sale of the goods to themselves. Over-arching rules (such
as competition law or sector-specific regulation) may either encourage
or prevent participants from interacting in a manner beneficial to the
development of governance and contracts that enhance sector
outcomes.
Geographically-focused IPAs, formed initially as
provider lobby groups to advocate for provider
interests during a time of change, offered an avenue
whereby providers could coordinate their activities,
develop new services, and tender for contracts in
addition to the ‘Section 88’ arrangements. Many
IPAs (such as the Wellington Independent
Practitioner Association [WIPA]) formed nonprofit
trusts to manage these contracts; some even had
nominal community representation on their
governance bodies.70 A small number of GPs,
principally in the Waikato and Bay of Plenty, also
experimented with capitation funding contracts.71
However, the distinguishing feature of the IPA-
aligned trusts was that they were formed, governed
and operated principally by provider interests. The
member providers maintained their individual
independent businesses for ‘Section 88’ business in
addition to their interest in the IPA activities, and the
contracts that the IPAs entered into complemented
rather than competed with the ‘Section 88’ business.
For example, IPAs entered into contracts for services
such as immunisation, maternity services, and
management of pharmaceutical and laboratory
budgets. Moreover, many of the financial gains from
the additional contracts were invested directly into
provider benefits. For example, savings from
pharmaceutical and laboratory-management
contracts were used to fund provider education and
to establish locum-management schemes in at least
one IPA. In essence, IPAs were co-operatives of
independent business providers that acted in the
interests of the individual members, in the same way
as Fonterra is a cooperative of individual farm
businesses organised for the collective benefit of the
farmers. 
By the end of the 1990s, despite the increased
funding of alternative providers, the independent
GPs funded through ‘Section 88’ remained
overwhelmingly the dominant form of primary
healthcare provider. Only around 15% of GPs were in
salaried employment, and fewer than 3% were
employed by the community-governed trusts.72 It
has been claimed that up to 20% of GPs were
engaged in some form of capitated scheme.73 But,
because the ‘Section 88’ scheme was available for all
individuals (including those nominally covered by a
capitated practice) and because there was no
registration-monitoring in place, it is far from clear
that these capitated providers faced the full financial
risks of capitation. GPs could charge patients and
avoid bearing financial risks – and, if costs exceeded
income, community-based providers could divert
excess demand to providers who were funded
through ‘Section 88’.
Transitioning to the NZPHCS: the
development of PHOs 
The environment into which the NZPHCS was
implemented was therefore characterised by two
distinctly different models of primary healthcare
delivery, with strong pre-existing professional and
community alliances. The consumer-governed
model was very close to the PHO model, where the
PHO is the agent of the patient and subcontracts
care-delivery to the provider. Consequently,
consumer-governed entities were able to make a
relatively seamless transition to PHO status. As they
already had contracts with service providers (either
salary or another contract form), and as they and
their constituent populations already had an access
agreement that was independent of the contracted
PHOs did not
compete for
patients. They
competed for
providers, who
would supply the
patients. 
70 Pauline Barnett. 2003. ‘Into the unknown:
the anticipation and experience of
membership of independent practitioner
associations’ Journal of the New Zealand
Medical Association 116(1171) (available
online at www.nzma.org.nz/journal/
116-1171/382).
71 Peter Crampton, Frances Sutton and Jon
Foley. 2003 (see footnote 8). 
72 Antony Raymont, Roy Lay-Yee, Janet
Pearson, and Peter Davis. 2002. ‘New
Zealand general practitioners’ characteris-
tics and workload: the National Primary
Medical Care Survey’ The New Zealand
Medical Journal 118(1215) (available
online at www.nzma.org.nz/journal/
118-1215/1475/).
73 Martin Hefford, Peter Crampton and Jon
Foley. 2005 (see footnote 3). 
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service providers, these entities had mechanisms in
place that allowed them to act as genuine managed-
care entities and market their services to potential
new members at the PHO level. 
However, this was not the case for the
remaining population and providers. To address this,
the NZPHCS contained transition arrangements for
the formation of new PHOs. These arrangements
specified that existing patient-provider relationships
(access agreements) could be used as the basis for
PHO formation, which enabled new PHOs to be
formed from provider alliances. Consequently,
competition for patients in the new PHOs arose from
providers choosing which PHO to join and ‘bringing
their patient lists with them’. Competition in PHO
formation, therefore, was not between PHOs for
patients; rather, it was between PHOs for providers,
who would furnish the patients. So – although 95%
of the population is registered with a PHO – the vast
majority of New Zealanders have no explicit
knowledge about which PHO they are registered
with, nor about the package of care management
provided by that PHO.74
Under these arrangements, the provider-
patient relationship (rather than the relationship
between the patient and the managed-care entity)
becomes the driver of primary healthcare
management for most New Zealanders. PHO clients
are compelled under the transition arrangements to
buy their ‘bundle’ of care management and care
delivery from the care deliverer, rather than from the
care manager. This is the equivalent of panelbeaters
choosing the insurance company for individuals who
agree to come to them for accident-based vehicle
repairs. Furthermore, most of the insurance
companies are actually run by clubs of panelbeaters,
who manage both the insurance contracts and the
vehicle repairs of their customers. If individuals don’t
like aspects of their insurance policy and wish to
change their insurance company, they must change
their panelbeater. These types of arrangements have
significant implications for both competition and
governance of PHOs. 
The implications for competition 
Because PHO income streams rely on provider-
patient relationships, PHOs must sign up providers
under exclusive contracts in order to prevent a
provider taking clients – and income – to another
PHO. Thus, care management and care provision are
vertically integrated (see Figure 3 on page 22), and
consumer choice is confined to a choice between
‘bundles’. This does not pose a problem as long as
there are many bundles from which the consumer
can choose. However, without choice, consumers
are forced to settle for one bundle. Whilst
consumers may choose between individual
providers within this bundle, all providers are
delivering to the same care-management specifi-
cations, and so choice in care management will be
limited. This can lead to a concentration of market
power in care management, with inherent
possibilities of increased costs (because there is no
competition to incentivise cost management) and
reduced innovation in care-management practices
(because there is no need to differentiate services
from those of a potential competitor). Innovation
may occur, but at a much slower pace than if
competition was present. 
The fact that ‘additional’ funding under the
NZPHCS is available only for care delivered under a
PHO arrangement has further contributed to
reduction in competition, and has increased the
likelihood that IPA-formed PHOs will become the
dominant institutional form. As mentioned earlier,
the original PHOs (which were based upon
consumer-governed provider forms) transitioned to
PHO status very soon after the NZPHCS’s
implementation. Because these PHOs had access to
higher subsidies under the NZPHCS, they could
charge lower fees than providers still on ‘Section 88’
agreements. Thus, individuals in locations where
consumer-governed PHOs were established had
strong incentives to terminate their access
arrangement with Section-88-funded providers and
to sign up with the consumer-governed PHOs. So
GPs had to move rapidly to protect their businesses,
by forming their own PHOs. The already-established
IPAs provided a vehicle for this to occur in a timely
manner. Consequently, IPAs took the lead in forming
new provider-driven PHOs. Not surprisingly, the
result is a bias towards general-practitioner interests
within the governance of such PHOs. 
As IPA-aligned GPs were already the dominant
provider form and as the IPAs themselves were
arranged around geographical communities of
provider interest, it was natural for IPA-aligned PHOs
to emerge as the dominant PHO form within DHB
boundaries. As there was typically only one IPA per
geographical region, the implications for
competition and consumer choice are significant.
Analysis of PHO formation and enrolment patterns
confirms that over 90% of individuals registered in
PHOs in December 2004 were registered with PHOs
formed around IPAs. Moreover, most PHOs are
operating as local geographic monopolies.75 Even
Geographical
constraints on
PHOs, the
dominance of IPA-
based PHOs, and
differential funding
based on provider
(not patient)
characteristics …
the result is
minimal 
competition
between PHOs. 
74 Allan Wyllie. 2004. Primary Health/PHO
Communications Campaign Research:
National Survey. Phoenix Research.
Auckland (available online at
www.moh.govt.nz/moh.nsf/wpgIndex/
Publications-General+Practitioner+Fees+
in+New+Zealand; document is C in list).
75 Bronwyn Howell. 2005 (see footnote 34).
Chapter 3.
A risky business: moving New Zealand towards a managed-care health system – page 21 – Competing for Governance
where there appears to be competition between
PHOs, it is not at all clear that this will lead to real
consumer choice, because the ‘competing’ PHOs
are differentiated on their Access and Interim
funding bases. An individual with ‘Interim’ charac-
teristics is unlikely to be accepted by an Access PHO
because this might jeopardise the balance of patient
mix that leads to the Access PHO being paid higher
rates for all registered individuals. (Most Access
PHOs are maintaining very close to the 50%
maximum of non-Access-characteristic individuals
on their registers, in order to maximise preferential
funding.)76
The implications for governance 
Consequently, most PHOs formed around provider
groups are likely to be governed, at least in the initial
stages, as if they are supplier-owned IPA co-
operatives rather than consumer-governed entities
or entities that have a balanced decision-making
process.77
The consumer-driven PHOs were formed
around common consumer interests, and this is
reflected in their governance arrangements (which
include clearly defined processes for membership
and ‘inclusive’ processes for electing or appointing
boards). The IPA-driven PHOs, however, had no
such shared consumer interest around which to
build their governance structures. Because the
motivation behind their formation was principally to
protect the interests of a specific provider group,78 it
is not surprising to find that their governance
processes are more reminiscent of a self-perpet-
uating trust where the founders, in conjunction with
management, determine the composition of the
board in perpetuity. Where ‘community’ represen-
tatives are included, they are more likely to be
appointed by a nominating body chosen by, or
acceptable to, the founders. Few PHOs have
community representatives nominated or elected by
their constituent community, in the way that
community representatives on DHB boards are
elected. As PHOs are private-sector entities, there is
no capacity for influence to be exerted in their
governance through national political processes (as
can occur when central-government politicians are
held to account for the activities of DHB board
members they have appointed). 
It is therefore extremely unclear to whom most
PHO ‘community representatives’ are directly
accountable. If constituents are unhappy with care-
management decisions, their only effective signal is
to remove their custom – there is no direct
governance right for registered individuals specified
in most PHO constitutions. Consequently, the
majority of New Zealand’s PHOs bear no
resemblance to the consumer-owned cooperatives
and nonprofit entities that have prevailed (in many
healthcare-insurance markets) to overcome insurer
opportunism or (in many healthcare-provider
markets) to overcome the information asymmetry
between patients and providers. This suggests the
governance arrangements will most likely lead to, at
best, conflicts of interest and, at worst, prioritising of
provider interests over both patients’ (Group B)
healthcare interests and all individuals’ (Group A)
insurance-market interests. 
IPA dominance in PHO formation means that,
even where community governance exists, provider
interests will be likely to dominate decision-making.
Providers’ interests are already aligned, via IPA
activities. Community interests are likely to be very
diverse – so it is more difficult, and thus takes longer,
for community representatives on a PHO board to
coordinate their interests.79 One PHO manager
reports taking 18 months to bring eager but
uninformed community representatives ‘up to
speed’ on PHO issues.80 In these circumstances, the
need for quick decision-making by the PHO board
leaves it subject to ‘provider capture’.81 Boards are
also similarly exposed to ‘management capture’.  As
many IPA-formed PHOs have entered into
management contracts with IPA-controlled
management companies,82 this means their boards
are doubly exposed to provider capture. 
The ability for a single provider group to be able
to exert such control over PHO decision-making
renders questionable the ability of the NZPHCS to
deliver ‘balanced’ PHO governance and decision-
making. Under the existing arrangements, it would
be difficult to make decisions about letting provider
contracts without undue influence from a specific
provider type. It is unlikely that a board under such
influence would willingly agree to let contracts to
competing provider types. If new providers are
admitted to the PHO cooperative, they will most
likely complement (rather than compete with) the
dominant provider type. This would appear to inhibit
the NZPHCS from achieving its objective of
increasing the range of provider types that have
access to the increased funds, at least in IPA-
governed PHOs. Any innovation that occurs under
this arrangement is likely to be general-practitioner-
centric innovation, rather than the ‘pan-provider’
innovation of the consumer-governed PHOs.
Moreover, the potential conflicts of interest that arise
How can the
NZPHCS deliver
‘balanced’
governance 
and decision-
making, when
one group of
interests is able to
exert so much
control? 
76 Martin Hefford, Peter Crampton and Jon
Foley. 2005 (see footnote 3). 
77 Laurence Malcolm and Nicholas Mays.
1999. ‘New Zealand’s independent
practitioner associations: a working
model of clinical governance in primary
care?’ British Medical Journal 319(7221)
pp1340-2. 
78 Pauline Barnett. 2003 (see footnote 70). 
79 Henry Hansman. 1996 (see footnote 42). 
80 Personal communication with the clinical
manager of a PHO management
company. 
81 Paul Milgrom and John Roberts. 1992.
Economics, Organization and
Management. Prentice-Hall. Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey. p315. 
82 For example: WIPA Ltd, which manages
five PHOs in the lower North Island, is a
limited liability company owned by 59
GPs – and its shares can be owned only
by GPs who are currently practising in the
region.
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when providers and insurers are interconnected call
into question the entire rationale for provider
representation in PHO decision-making, as
providers in their role as PHO governors are
essentially ‘letting contracts to themselves’. 
Implications for the interaction of
governance and competition 
As they increase the numbers of PHOs they manage,
IPA-controlled management companies may further
reduce the range of care-management services and
discourage innovation. Management contracts
observed to date give management companies the
power to act, for all financial, operational and
strategic activities, as if they are the PHO. In effect,
the management company is the PHO – and multiple
PHOs managed by one management company83 are
a de facto ‘MegaPHO’. 
A company that manages many PHOs will be
likely to use a similar models to manage all of them.
Thus, not only are competition and innovation
reduced within DHB boundaries; they are also
reduced across DHBs. Identical management
contracts are likely to arise because PHO
management lends itself to economies of scale.
Larger providers can offer services at a lower cost
per registered member. ‘MegaPHOs’ thus have a
cost advantage over smaller PHOs, and this will
affect PHO formation and competition into the
future. Providers unhappy with the ‘MegaPHO’
management become ‘locked in’, because the only
option they have is to exit the PHO and form another
(smaller) PHO in competition. But this new PHO will
be more costly to operate, and exiting providers
forfeit the benefits of the previous arrangement
(such as education and the locum scheme).
Likewise, new providers will prefer to join an existing
PHO rather than start afresh. This reinforces the
current arrangements. There are now real barriers to
new PHO entry.
The manner in which government subsidies are
differentiated further reduces the likelihood that
there will be competition to ‘MegaPHOs’. A dissat-
isfied provider may leave a ‘MegaPHO’, taking their
patients with them. But, if the provider does not join
another PHO, the government payments for the
provider’s patients revert to the less-generous
‘Section 88’ payments. Provider exit from a PHO
Providers are likely
to become locked
into existing
arrangements –
and this will
further reduce the
potential for
competition
between PHOs.
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Figure 3. Primary healthcare competition under the NZPHCS
83 For example, Southlink manages 13 of
the 17 PHOs in the South Island.
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thus means many patients will most likely leave their
now non-PHO higher-cost provider for another
PHO-aligned provider. Differential government
funding thus further contributes to the barriers that
providers face in exiting a PHO. The market power
of the ‘MegaPHO’ in its core market constituency –
providers – is increased. 
Is evolution to the desired model
likely?
These arrangements mean it is highly unlikely that
the interim arrangements will ‘evolve’ into the
managed-care model proposed in the NZPHCS.
Rather, the more likely outcome will be
entrenchment of the transition arrangements. It is
highly unlikely that the self-perpetuating IPA-driven
PHOs will willingly alter their current contractual or
governance arrangements, because to do so would
reduce the providers’ ability to control PHO
activities. And, as illustrated above, their constituent
communities lack the power (as either consumers or
via the governance arrangements) to impose
community-driven change. Ironically, by removing
control of primary healthcare purchasing from the
Ministry of Health and placing it in the types of PHOs
that have emerged, the NZPHCS may have actually
reduced effective community control of primary
healthcare spending and made it even harder for
some of the ‘pan-provider’ integrated-care aspects
of the Minister’s vision for the sector to be delivered.
84 For example: price monitoring by DHBs is
confined to patient co-payments (which
are required to be levied according to
premium-subsidy classifications), and no
insurance-sector regulations have been
implemented.
85 Minister of Health. 2001 (see footnote 2).
6. For the Future
It is not likely 
that the current
arrangements 
will evolve in the
desired direction.
Further 
intervention 
will be necessary.
One of the stated intentions of the NZPHCS policy is
to develop a managed-care healthcare system with
community-focused PHOs acting as the insurers and
care coordinators for defined populations. Yet it
appears to have created a set of institutions and
interactions dominated by provider interests, to the
exclusion of attention to the insurance issues that are
central to the efficiency and equity outcomes of all
healthcare systems. 
The initial arrangements have allowed the
patient-provider agreements to proxy for the usual
agreements between Group A individuals and the
insurers, and (because of the ‘pass-through’
contracts between PHOs and providers) have
obfuscated any distinctions between capitation
payments as premium subsidies paid to insurers and
capitation payments as treatment subsidies paid to
providers. As a result, no-one has undertaken the
insurer’s role of ‘balancing’ the interests of sector
participants. Indeed, the fact that regulatory and
monitoring activities are focused upon service-
delivery metrics84 suggests that the design of the
entire strategy has been focused on healthcare
service-delivery instruments – that is, the
relationships between Group B individuals and
service providers – even though the required
outcomes make it necessary for attention to be
focused primarily on insurance-market design issues
and, in particular, on the balancing of interests
between Group A and Group B individuals. 
A presumption has been made85 that, over time,
interactions in the sector will evolve as the NZPHCS
moves from ‘transitional’ to ‘fully operational’.
However, because PHOs are already well-
established, and because the prevailing governance
arrangements are unlikely to lead to evolutionary
change, it appears likely that alternative outcomes
will require further policy and legislative change.
This requires real debate about the type of state-
funded healthcare systems New Zealand wants, and
about the insurance-based instruments that will be
used to achieve it. 
This debate needs to involve all interested
sector participants. It also needs to involve
meaningful discussion about who should undertake
specific responsibilities. For example, should
insurance provision be a public- or private-sector
activity? Will there be a single insurer or multiple
insurers in competition with each other? How should
the activities of the insurer be monitored and
enforced? Should communities take a primary role in
this activity, or are other forms of organisation (such
as designated regulators, or local or central
government processes) more effective in co-
ordinating this activity? 
Some key guiding principles must be provided
about the nature of how trade-offs should be made,
principally in respect of how premium subsidies and
treatment subsidies should be set. For example,
should the system be fully state-funded (as in the
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United Kingdom’s NHS), or are patient payments
required? If patient payments are required, should
they be made as premium contributions, co-
payments, or both? And should trade-offs between
Group A and Group B individuals be based solely on
health-state characteristics – or is the insurer
required to undertake socially inspired wealth-
transfers as well as health-state-determined
treatment payments? 
Only when these issues have been addressed
will it be feasible to address the optimal nature of the
contracts between Group B individuals, healthcare
providers, and insurers. It may also be presumptive
to assume that a single model of insurance and care-
delivery will suffice. Plurality in both may enable
evolution of different contractual, organisational and
service-delivery forms that meet the varying needs
of different sector participants whilst simultaneously
maintaining and improving responsiveness to the
requirements of different communities.
Whatever changes are made, it is imperative
that they be informed by such debate, as well as by
the learning that has come from examining the
evolving effects of models and principles in
healthcare service delivery and insurance
management both in New Zealand and worldwide. 
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